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In December of 1981, an article in the New England Journal of
Medicine reported the treatment of four previously healthy homosexual
men for Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia and other multiple viral infec-
tions.' The physicians reporting the cases characterized the study in the
following manner: "This syndrome represents a potentially transmissi-
ble immune deficiency." 2 From this first report the syndrome has be-
come known as AIDS-acquired immunodeficiency syndrome. The dis-
ease has spread across the country and the world, creating complex
medical and legal questions. As of December 8, 1986, 28,098 cases of
AIDS had been reported. Of these cases, 15,757 people have already
died.'
Medical knowledge about AIDS is by no means complete. AIDS is
a disease which alters the body's immune system and its ability to fight
off disease. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has determined
that an individual has contracted AIDS, if among other criteria, he has
been diagnosed as having a life threatening opportunistic infection,4 or
he has been diagnosed as having Kaposi's sarcoma, and he has tested
positive for the HTLV-III (Human T-Cell Lymphotropic Virus Type
III) antibody. 5 The virus can be detected by a blood test, which has
I. Gottlieb, Pneumocystis Carinii Pneumonia and Mucosal Candidiasis in Previously
Healthy Homosexual Men. 305 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1425 (1981).
2. Id.
3. Update. Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-United States, 35 MORBIDITY & MOR-
TALITY WEEKLY REP. 757 (December 12, 1986) [hereinafter Update].
4. An opportunistic infection is one that is caused by an organism that would not ordinarily
cause disease in a healthy individual. The virus or bacteria exist in the body, but do not usually
manifest themselves as a disease process. HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 470
(M. Braumwald ed. 1987).
5. Revision of the Case Definition of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome for National
Reporting - United States 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 373 (June 28, 1985). The
Human T-Cell Lymphotropic Virus Type III (HTLV-Ill) is the virus that actually causes the
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made diagnosis of the disease more definite. However, the existence of
two groups of people that have diseases similar to AIDS complicates
the diagnosis of AIDS. The first group consists of people who have the
HTLV-II1 virus in their blood without manifesting the disease. Within
the second group are people who have AIDS-type immunologic
abnormalties, but who do not meet all the criteria to be diagnosed as
having AIDS. People within this second group are characterized as
having an "AIDS-related complex."8 Whether or not individuals in ei-
ther of these classes will eventually develop AIDS is unknown. It is also
unknown whether they are capable of transmitting the disease."
The mortality rate for AIDS is high. At least 50% of its victims
die within eighteen months of diagnosis and 80% die within three
years. 10 The CDC has identified six classes of people at high risk for
contracting AIDS: (1) homosexually active men, (2) intravenous drug
users, (3) Haitian immigrants, (4) hemophiliacs, (5) heterosexuals hav-
ing sexual contact with persons having AIDS or at risk for AIDS, and
(6) recipients of blood or blood products." However, people not in-
cluded in these classes can still contract the disease.
Although it is known that AIDS can be transmitted by sexual con-
tact or by contaminated blood or needles, doctors and scientists have
still been unable to establish that the disease cannot be transmitted by
other means. The CDC has stated: "There continues to be no evidence
of nonspecific transmission through casual contact; insect bites; or food-
borne, waterborne or environmental spread among AIDS cases."' 2
However, the HTLV-III virus has been found to thrive in the saliva,
semen, and other body fluids of patients with AIDS, leaving open the
question whether other types of contact might spread the disease."'
In the face of medical uncertainty, a number of difficult legal
questions have arisen. On one side are the victims of this devastating
and fatal disease. On the other side is a frightened society, confronted
by a disease about which there exists incomplete medical knowledge.
disease known as AIDS. See Goedert & Blattner, The Epidemiology of AIDS and Related Con-
ditions, in AIDS at 2 (1985).
6. Goedert & Blattner, supra note 5, at 2.
7. Id. at 5.
8. Id. at 7.
9. Id. at 6.
10. Id. at 7.
II. Id. at 6.
12. Update, supra note 3, at 760.
13. Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome in the United States: A Selective Review. 14
CRITICAL CARE MED. 819, 820 (1986).
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Despite the debilitating nature of the disease, the victims often wish to
maintain as normal a life-style as possible. They want to be able to
continue to work or go to school for as long as possible. When they are
acutely ill, they want the best medical care they can receive. But soci-
ety has often attempted to limit AIDS victims' movement and partici-
pation in society. AIDS patients have been forced to fight to attend
public schools, 4 to keep their jobs and job benefits," and for medical 6
and even mortuary care. 7 The most important question raised by this
mysterious disease is a basic one: Where should we draw the line be-
tween the right of an individual with a contagious disease to live his life
free in society and the right of society to protect itself from the disease
the individual carries? The disease has also raised the narrower ques-
tion of whether an AIDS victim can be held liable for transmitting the
disease to other persons. Finally, accompanying AIDS is a difficult is-
sue concerning confidentiality: Now that a test for AIDS is available,
who has a right to know the results of an individual's test? This com-
mentary will examine these questions and some of the answers.
I. PUBLIC HEALTH LAWS AND THE POLICE POWER
AIDS is not the first contagious disease that has frightened society
and placed limits on individual rights. One of the first public health
cases in the United States involved the right of an individual to refuse
vaccination ordered by a state statute. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts8
the Cambridge Board of Health had required all adults in Cambridge
to be vaccinated against the threat of a smallpox outbreak. Jacobson,
who had experienced a severe reaction to a vaccination as a child, chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the order. He alleged that subjecting
him to fines or imprisonment for failing to be vaccinated deprived him
of liberty without due process. 9 The United States Supreme Court
held that the board's requirement was constitutional. In reaching its
decision, the Court first determined that the state had the authority to
enact the statute under the police power.20 The Court stated that the
state's right to exercise its police powers is limited by the rights guar-
14. White v. Western School Corp., No. 85 Civ. 1192 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 16, 1985).
15. See Comment, AIDS. A Legal Epidemic?, 17 AKRON L. REV. 717, 733 (1985).
16. AIDS and the Law, 69 A.B.A. J. 1014, 1015 (1983).
17. Mathews, The Initial Impact of AIDS on Public Health Law in the United States, 257
J. A.M.A. 345, 349 (1987).
18. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
19. Id. at 26.
20. Id. at 25.
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anteed to individuals under the Constitution. 1 Individual liberties, in
turn, are limited by the need for society to protect the general public.2
The Court noted that it is possible for local police powers to be exer-
cised in such a manner that they are arbitrary or unreasonable. 3 In
this case, the Court held that the police powers were not exercised in
an unreasonable manner. 4
In arriving at its holding in Jacobson, the Supreme Court ana-
lyzed the relationship of society and the individual. The Court reasoned
that society has a duty to protect its members and would fail in this
duty if it allowed the rights of one individual to endanger society. 3 The
Constitution does not guarantee a person the right to dominate the ma-
jority. Individuals living in the community and taking advantage of the
benefits of the local government must submit to its laws.26 Constitu-
tional liberties are not absolute rights to be totally free from any re-
straints at all times. Restraints are necessary for the common good.'
In Jew Ho v. Williamson,28 another early case, a federal court
examined the right of a city board of health to quarantine individuals.
The San Francisco Board of Health quarantined a large portion of the
Chinese section of the city after the bubonic plague allegedly caused
nine deaths. 9 Although the court recognized that the Board of Health
had broad discretion in enacting and implementing its regulations, 0
the court found this regulation to be unreasonable.3 1 Under the terms
of the Board's order, ten to twelve blocks of the Chinese portion of the
city were sealed off. Cases of plague had been reported in some of the
blocks, but not in others. The court found that by quarantining such a
large area, and by allowing movement within the quarantined area, the
regulation would encourage the spread of the disease rather than con-
fine it.3
2
As both Jacobson and Jew Ho indicate, exercise of the police
power in the public health setting affects two groups in opposite fash-
ion. It is clear that the states have discretion to restrict an individual's
21. Id.
22. Id. at 26.
23. Id. at 28.
24. Id. at 39.
25. Id. at 29.
26. Id. at 38.
27. Id. at 29.
28. 103 F. 10 (N.D. Cal. 1900).
29. Id. at 12.
30. Id. at 21.
31. Id. at 26.
32. Id. at 21-22.
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personal freedoms in an effort to control a contagious disease. A regu-
lation will likely be held valid if it is rationally designed to protect the
health of society.3"
Unlike smallpox or the plague, it now appears that anyone with
AIDS can transmit the disease for as long as he has it. Since there is
no known cure for the disease,"' its victims are contagious for the rest
of their lives. The public health background provides a foundation for
regulations and laws which affect AIDS victims. However, AIDS
brings new problems to rules established in the area of public health.
The questions, unanswered as of yet by medical research, intensify the
difficulty in drawing the line between individual freedom and the safety
of society. Medical research has not been able to discover the exact
modes of transmission of AIDS. The uncertainty as to when and how
the disease can be transmitted must be considered when victims of
AIDS attempt to join the mainstream of society.
The first reported case addressing the question of whether AIDS
victims should be kept separate from the healthy population was La-
Rocca v. Dalsheim.6 In that case, uninfected inmates in the New York
correctional system sought an order requiring physical examination of
all inmates and employees before there could be any further movement
into or out of the facility. The inmates also sought an order that prison-
ers with AIDS be removed from the prison system and placed in hospi-
tals.3 6 The New York Supreme Court denied relief, relying heavily on
testimony from medical personnel. Because there was no known test for
the disease at that time, the court denied the inmates' request that per-
sons at the facility be tested for AIDS.3 7 The court also refused to or-
der that the inmates diagnosed as having AIDS be removed from the
prison. The court recognized that under New York law, prison officials
could remove inmates from the institution in the event of an outbreak
of a contagious disease.3" However, after considering medical testi-
mony, the court concluded that prisoners with AIDS were adequately
isolated from the general prison population."
The attitude of the healthy prisoners in LaRocca is representative
in many ways of society's reaction to AIDS victims. Faced with a
deadly disease about which little is known, we simply attempt to have
33. LEGAt. ASPECTS OF HEALTH POLICY 9 (R. Roemer & G. McKray ed. 1980).
34. See Mathews, supra note 17, at 344.
35. 467 N.Y.S.2d 302 (1983).
36. Id. at 304.
37. Id. at 310.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 311.
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the infected individual removed from society. After careful considera-
tion of what is medically known about the disease, the court in La-
Rocca concluded that those people with AIDS presented no threat to
the community. AIDS sufferers were allowed to remain in the prison
and the only restrictions placed on the victims were medical precau-
tions which governed contact between healthy individuals and body
fluids of the victim.
40
II. AIDS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
The Court's position in LaRocca that there is no reason to exclude
AIDS victims from public institutions is also the apparent trend in
cases involving attendance of public schools by children who have
AIDS. Lawsuits have been brought in several states; some to keep chil-
dren out of schools, some by parents trying to get their children into
school. Even children who do not actually have AIDS, but who have
tested positive for the AIDS antibody, have met with resistance from
the public school systems.' 1 And in the most extreme case, a child was
prevented from attending school merely because his sister had died of
AIDS. 2
The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has conducted a study of
the problem of children with AIDS and the hazards of placing these
children in a public school setting.43 The study first reiterated the find-
ing that AIDS is primarily transmitted through sexual contact and in-
fected blood or blood products.4 4 The study stated: "Based on current
evidence, casual person-to-person contact as would occur among school
children appears to pose no risk."'4 5 However, the CDC noted that
young children, or children with neurological disorders, theoretically
pose an increased risk of transmitting the disease due to their lack of
control of body secretions.4 The CDC's recommendations include the
following: "For most infected school-aged children, the benefits of an
unrestricted setting would outweigh the risks of their acquiring poten-
40. Id.
41. See Mathews, supra note 17, at 345.
42. Matthews & Neslund, The Initial Impact of AIDS on Public Health Law in the United
States - 1986, 257 J. A.M.A. 345 (1987) (citing Beasley, Fear of AIDS Bars Georgia Boy From
Class, Atlanta Constitution, Feb. 15, 1986 at I-A).
43. Education and Foster Care of Children with Human T-Lymphotrophic Virus Type II1/
Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus. 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 517 (August
30, 1985) [hereinafter Education].
44. Id. at 518.
45. Id. at 519.
46. Id.
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tially harmful infections in the setting and the apparent nonexistent
risk of transmission of HTLV-III/LAV."' 7 Thus, the CDC has taken
the position that casual contact among school children poses little risk
that the virus will be transmitted.48
Despite these findings from the CDC, school children with AIDS
have had to fight to establish a right to attend public schools. An illus-
trative case is that of an Indiana teenager named Ryan White.49 White
is a hemophiliac who contracted AIDS after receiving a contaminated
blood product.50 Although the school system had offered home instruc-
tion, Ryan White's parents wanted him to be able to attend classes.
The Whites filed suit for a preliminary injunction to prevent the school
board from barring the boy from classes.51 They sought relief under the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA),52 the Reha-
bilitation Act,53 the Civil Rights Act,5' and the fourteenth amendment
due process and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitu-
tion.55 The court refused to issue the preliminary injunction because
White had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 56 White was
eventually admitted to school, but was promptly barred again after par-
ents of other students filed suit under an Indiana statute governing
communicable diseases.57 The statute prohibited a person having cus-
tody of a child with a communicable disease from allowing the child to
attend school."8 The court issued a preliminary injunction restraining
White's mother and the school district from allowing him to attend
classes. However, the court later discovered that the Health Officer of
Howard County had issued a certificate giving White the right to re-
turn to school."9 The court found that the legislature did not intend for
the statute to apply to persons who have custody of a child with a com-
municable disease, if the appropriate health officer has given written
permission for the child to attend school.6 0 The order preventing White
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. White v. Western School Corp., No. 85 Civ. 1192 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 16, 1985).
50. Id. at 1. See Conant, AIDS in the Classroom, 107 Newsweek 6 (March 3, 1986).
51. White, No. 85 Civ. 1192 at I.
52. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1454 (1982).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
54. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1982).
55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
56. White v. Western School Corp., No. 85 Civ. 1192 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 16, 1985).
57. See Bogart v. White, No. 86-144 (Clinton Cir. Ct. Apr. 10, 1986).
58. IND. CODE § 16-1-9-7 (1983).
59. Bogart v. White, No. 86-144 (Clinton Cir. Ct. Apr. 10, 1986).
60. Id. at 4.
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from attending school was therefore dissolved and he was permitted to
return to classes. 6'
In Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School District 2 a California
district court addressed the question of whether AIDS is a protected
"handicap" under Section 504 of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act,63
an issue which the court failed to reach in White. The Act provides
that qualified handicapped individuals cannot be excluded solely on the
basis of their handicap from participation in programs receiving federal
financial assistance."' Thomas, a five-year-old with AIDS, had been
barred from school after he bit another child. The court in Thomas
ruled that AIDS is a "handicap" under the statute. Therefore, the
school district was required to reasonably accommodate Thomas. 5
Thus, the court required the school district to readmit Thomas and al-
low him to attend school in a regular classroom. 6 The court went a
step further and found that the school district had not shown that
Thomas presented a risk of transmission of the disease by his presence
in the classroom.67 The court placed the burden of showing that the
infected child was a risk on the party seeking to exclude him."
In Thomas and White, the infected children were allowed to re-
turn to their regular classrooms. Both courts decided the question of
whether the children should be allowed in a regular classroom by rely-
ing on medical knowledge about AIDS and the risk of transmission. As
medical knowledge about AIDS becomes more certain, it should be
possible for individual school districts to formulate guidelines governing
class attendance by children who have AIDS. The CDC has published
recommendations for developing guidelines for school children with
AIDS.6' These recommendations state that the decision whether to al-
low a child to attend regular classes should be made on a case-by-case
basis by a team that includes the child's physician, public health offi-
cials, and educational personnel.70 They also indicate that most infected
children should be allowed to attend school. They do not advocate
61. Id.
62. No. 886-609AHSC(BY) (C.D. Cal. 1986), noted in Federal Judge Terms AIDS a
Handicap Under Vocational Rehabilitation Act I AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 22, at 2 (Nov.
19, 1986) [hereinafter AIDS a Handicap].
63. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
64. Id.




69. Education, supra note 43.
70. Id. at 519.
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mandatory screening for AIDS.71 The Board of Directors of the Na-
tional Education Association has also recommended that local school
officials establish guidelines for students with AIDS. These recommen-
dations also suggest that decisions be made on a case-by-case basis and
"based solely on scientific and medical evidence and not on unfounded
fears of AIDS or public pressure."7 2 Both sets of guidelines recommend
that restrictions be imposed on children who are unable to control their
bodily secretions or who display behavior such as biting.7
III. AIDS AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
The presence of AIDS in the work place has also raised many
questions. Workers fired from their jobs because of AIDS have infre-
quently gone to the courts due to fear of the publicity that would re-
sult. 4 Employers have fired workers with AIDS or placed them on in-
voluntary disability leave with full salary and benefits. 5 In the
employment setting, victims of other communicable diseases have
sought protection under the Rehabilitation Act. 6 In Arline v. School
Board of Nassau County77 a third grade teacher was fired because she
was susceptible to tuberculosis. Arline alleged that she was "otherwise
qualified" for the job, and that her susceptibility to tuberculosis made
her a "handicapped individual" under the Vocational Rehabilitation
Act.78 The district court had ruled that contagious diseases were not a
"handicap" under the Act.7 9 The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district
court and found that the language of the Act supports a conclusion
that the Act covers a contagious disease.80 The Supreme Court af-
firmed the court of appeals and found that a contagious disease is a
"handicap" under the statute.81 The Court refused to distinguish be-
tween the physical effects of a disease on the patient and the effects of
71. Id. at 520.
72. New Guidelines Issued by NEA on Teachers, Students with AIDS, I AIDS Pol'y & L.
(BNA) No. 13, at 4 (Jul. 16, 1986).
73. Id. See also Education. supra note 43.
74. N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1986, at D2, col. I.
75. Id. at col. 2.
76. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982) states in relevant part: "Subject to the second sentence of
this subparagraph, the term 'handicapped individual' means ... any person who (i) has a physi-
cal or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activi-
ties, (ii) has a record of such impairment or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment."
77. 772 F.2d 759 (11th Cir. 1986), affid, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
78. Id. at 761.
79. See id.
80. Id. at 764.
81. School Board of Nassua County v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
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the disease on others.82 In addition, the majority opinion by Justice
Brennan stated that employers who receive federal funds would not be
allowed to use the distinction to justify discriminatory treatment.83 The
Court then considered the question of whether Arline was "otherwise
qualified" for her job. The Court noted that in some instances the risk
of contagion may prevent a person from being "otherwise qualified" for
the job. It discussed four factors (suggested by the American Medical
Association as amicus curiae) that should be analyzed in making this
determination: (1) the means of transmission of the disease, (2) the
duration of the risk of contagion, (3) the severity of the risk and (4)
the probability that the disease will be transmitted. 84 The Court stated
that in making these four inquiries, deference should be given to "the
reasonable medical judgments of the public health officials."8 5 The
court must then determine if the employer can reasonably accommo-
date the handicapped employee. The Court remanded the case to the
district court for additional factual findings on the issue of whether Ar-
line was "otherwise qualified." Justices Rehnquist and Scalia
dissented.8 6
The Arline decision impacts on the AIDS issue in several ways.
First, the law is now clear that a contagious disease can be a "handi-
cap." The Court's ruling in Arline will enable AIDS patients who have
been fired from their jobs with employers who receive federal funds to
seek relief under the Vocational Rehabilitation Act. Second, because
the Court held that deference should be given to the reasonable medi-
cal judgment of public health officials in determining if the threat of
contagion prevents the individual from being "otherwise qualified"
under the Act, medical officials and not individual employers will deter-
mine whether workers who have AIDS pose a threat to co-workers.
Another case in the context of employment discrimination involved
an AIDS victim who was fired by Broward County in Florida because
82. Id. at 1128.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1130-31.
85. Id. at 1131.
86. Justice Rehnquist contended that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which applies to any
program receiving federal financial assistance, does not unambiguously express the requirement
that, as a condition on the grant of federal funds, recipients must bear the costs of providing
employment to persons whose conditions pose a threat to others. Since obligations imposed on
federal grantees in exchange for funds create a relationship in the nature of a contract, Justice
Rehnquist reasoned that the validity of such a quid pro quo turns on the knowing and voluntary
acceptance of the terms. Those terms must be clearly expressed by Congress. Id. at 1132-34




he had the disease.8 7 Todd Shuttleworth, the victim, challenged the fir-
ing by filing a charge with the Florida Commission on Human Rela-
tions.8" The district court ruled that it was not necessary that Shut-
tleworth exhaust state and federal administrative remedies, despite the
Rehabilitation Act's requirement that such remedies be exhausted.89
Shuttleworth obtained an administrative ruling that AIDS was a pro-
tected handicap, but he eventually settled the suit. 90
Although AIDS victims have sought relief in the courts, both the
Justice Department and state legislatures have addressed the problem
of employment discrimination against AIDS patients. The Justice De-
partment has issued a memorandum adopting the approach that the
disabling effects of AIDS may be a "handicap" under the Vocational
Rehabilitation Act, but that the ability to transmit the disease is not a
"handicap."'" Some states have adopted policies that prohibit discrimi-
nation against the handicapped and have specifically declared AIDS to
be a handicap."
IV. CIVIL LIABILITY
One of the primary modes of transmission of AIDS is through sex-
ual contact. Since the disease is fatal, the question arises whether a
person with AIDS may be held liable for transmitting the disease to
another person. Also at issue is whether a person with the disease is
responsible for informing his sexual partners that he is contagious. The
law of negligence may provide answers to these questions.
A cause of action arising from negligence has four basic elements:
(1) a duty to conform to a standard of conduct recognized by society,
(2) a failure to act in that manner, (3) proximate cause between the
conduct and an injury to another person, and (4) actual damage or loss
to another person.93 If an infected person transmits AIDS to another,
he could be held liable if the above criteria are met. There is some
authority that a person who has a sexually transmissible disease has a
duty to warn his sexual partners that he has such a disease. 4
87. See Lacayo, AIDS Goes to Court, TIME, Dec. 8, 1986, at 73.
88. Shuttleworth v. Broward County, Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 406 (S.D. Fla. July 8,
1986).
89. Id. See also 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(2) (1982).
90. Landmark AIDS Bias Suit Settled, I Individual Empl. Rights (BNA), at 2 (Dec. 23,
1986).
91. N.Y. Times, Jun. 23, 1986, at A3, col. I.
92. N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1986, at A20, col. I.
93. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971).
94. See generally State v. Lankford, 29 Del. 594, 102 A. 63 (1917); Crowell v. Crowell, 180
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In Kathleen K. v. Robert B.95 a California court held that a wo-
man had stated a cause of action against a man who infected her with
genital herpes. 96 The court found that consent to sexual intercourse is
vitiated when one partner fraudulently represents that there is no risk
of transmission of a venereal disease.97 The cause of action was based
on the injury to the woman's body as a result of a man's failure to
inform her that he had a venereal disease before they engaged in sexual
relations. The defendant argued that he was protected by his constitu-
tional right to privacy, 8 but the court found that his right of privacy
was outweighed by the state's right to protect the health, welfare, and
safety of its citizens. 9"
The duty to inform others of the possibility of contracting a com-
municable disease such as AIDS is a pivotal point in determining the
limits of an individual's right of privacy. At this time of this writing, a
suit is pending against actor Rock Hudson's estate. The plaintiff has
alleged that Hudson knew he had AIDS, but that he continued to en-
gage in sexual relations with plaintiff.100 In addition, the suit names
two advisors and two physicians as defendants. 01
In a different context, the question of when a duty to warn arises
was considered by the California Supreme Court in Tarasoff v. Re-
gents of University of California.'"° In Tarasoff, the court held that a
therapist who determines that a patient may present a danger of vio-
lence has a duty to take reasonably necessary steps to protect the vic-
tim.103 Although AIDS does not present a threat of violence, it does
present a threat of death. The legal question now raised is whether the
rule announced in Tarasoff will be expanded to require physicians
treating AIDS patients to inform the patient's sexual partners of the
risk. The court in Tarasoff held that the need to protect others from
harm outweighs the need to protect the patient's confidentiality. 14 It is
logical to assume that this reasoning can be applied to require doctors
of AIDS patients to inform the patients' sexual partners of the risks of
N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920); DeVall v. Strunsk, 96 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
95. 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 997, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 277.
98. Id. at 996, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
99. Id.
100. Washington Post, Nov. 14, 1986, at Cl, col. 2.
101. Id.
102. 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334 (1976).
103. Id. at 20, 551 P.2d at 340.
104. Id. at 27, 551 P.2d at 347.
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transmission, under some circumstances.
The duty to warn others of the danger of transmission of AIDS is
also present when children with AIDS attend school. In Thomas, the
child had been removed from the classroom after biting a classmate.'0 5
So far, there have been no reported cases of AIDS being transmitted
by biting. But if it is possible to transmit AIDS by biting, could
Thomas be held liable? Because he is a child, Thomas might not real-
ize the danger he caused by biting another person.
A person may be held liable for negligence if his conduct does not
meet an objective standard. This standard of conduct is that which a
reasonable man would exhibit in the same situation. 106 But in applying
this standard of care, courts may take into consideration the age and
physical handicaps of the actor. Thus, the age and handicaps of the
actor can be taken into consideration when determining the reasonable-
ness of the actions involved."0 7 In an early case, Charbonneau v.
MacRury,0 8 a New Hampshire court considered the standard of care
expected of a minor. Charbonneau was an action for damages in which
a three-year-old was killed by a car driven by a seventeen-year-old.
One of the defenses raised was that the driver's age should be consid-
ered in determining the prescribed standard of care. 0 9 The court deter-
mined that the development as indicated by the age and experience of
an individual were considerations in determining the standard of
care. 10 If youngsters such as Thomas cannot understand the conse-
quences of biting other children, this lack of understanding will proba-
bly be considered in deciding the issue of negligence.
Physical handicaps can also alter the standard of care."' In Smith
v. Sneller,"' the court considered the precautions a blind person should
take to protect himself. The plaintiff (a blind man) in Smith, had
fallen into an open trench. The court found that a blind person must
use the common devices available to blind persons to protect his own
safety." If a handicapped person must exercise special precautions for
his own safety, it follows that he must also exercise those precautions to
105. Thomas, noted in AIDS a Handicap, supra note 62, at I.
106. W. PROSSER, supra note 93, § 32.
107. Id.
108. 84 N.H. 501, 153 A. 457 (1931).
109. Id. at 502, 153 A. at 459.
110. Id. at 508, 153 A. at 462; see also Argo v. Goodstein, 438 Pa. 468, 265 A.2d 783
(1970); Davis v. Feinstein, 370 Pa. 449, 88 A.2d 695 (1952).
III. Smith v. Sneller, 345 Pa. 68, 72, 26 A.2d 452, 454 (1942).
112. 345 Pa. 68, 26 A.2d 452 (1942).
113. Id. at 72, 26 A.2d at 454.
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protect the safety of others. Thus, an AIDS victim could be held to a
standard of care that requires him to inform others of the risk of trans-
mission of the disease.
CONCLUSION
The questions presented by AIDS are numerous. AIDS victims are
filing lawsuits to remain in public schools and to keep their jobs, and
they are winning. But society is still frightened by AIDS. In the ab-
sence of medical answers as to the communicability of the disease,
courts will have to set standards regarding the place of AIDS victims
in society. Courts in the past have been faced with conflicting medical
viewpoints on communicable diseases and have deferred to legislatures.
The legislatures of today are in a position to consider the available in-
formation and to set standards for AIDS patients to participate in both
school and work settings. The ruling in Arline that a contagious disease
can be a protected handicap gives victims of AIDS a ground for relief
when they are discriminated against by the public schools or by
employers.
As AIDS continues to spread and the cost of caring for its victims
increases, more victims may seek to impose liability upon those who are
responsible for infecting them. Voluntary abstinence from activities
known to transmit the disease would avoid the problem. At a mini-
mum, infected individuals should have a duty to inform those they
might infect of the dangers.
An individual's right of confidentiality may be determined by the
conduct involved. If there is little or no risk of transmitting the disease,
such as in a school or work setting, there is no need to inform others.
However, if the individual is engaging in conduct likely to spread the
disease, such as sexual intercourse, those at risk of becoming infected
should have the right to know of the danger.
The legal problems presented by the disease AIDS are numerous.
Society has often sought to exclude AIDS victims from public schools
and to keep them out of the work place. Thomas and White indicate
that the courts will not permit schools to arbitrarily exclude children
with AIDS from the classroom. In the work place as well, the courts
have protected AIDS victims from unwarranted dismissals. However,
the law is less settled with regard to the imposition of civil liability.
The question of who has a duty to warn third persons that an individ-
ual has AIDS is still open, although a decision in the lawsuit against
Rock Hudson's estate may provide answers to this question. One thing
is certain: Until a cure is found for AIDS, the disease will continue to
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present complex questions to courts, legislatures, and the entire legal
system.
Frances Means

